State of Utah v. Donald R. Johnson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
State of Utah v. Donald R. Johnson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John E. Hummel; Attorney for Appellant.
Scott Keith Wilson; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Colin R.
Winchester; Kane County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Johnson, No. 970730 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1252
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, Case No. 970730-C|:A 
vs. 
DONALD R. JOHNSON, 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, 
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER, PRESIDING. 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM h 231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801)1366-0180 
JOHN E HUMMEL 
165 North 100 East, Suite 5 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for Appellant 
COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
Kane County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD R. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970730-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, 
A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER, PRESIDING. 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON (7347) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
JOHN E HUMMEL COLIN R. WINCHESTER 
165 North 100 East, Suite 5 Kane County Attorney 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorney for Appellant 
Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. DEFENDANT REFUSED TO APPEAR FOR HIS PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
CONDUCTING THE HEARING IN HIS ABSENCE 11 
II. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO 
STAND TRIAL BASED UPON UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE 13 
III. DEFENDANT REPRESENTED HIMSELF AT TRIAL, AND 
THEREFORE MAY NOT CLAIM INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 15 
IV. DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL; ALL DELAYS WERE DUE TO DEFENDANT'S 
COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND DEFENDANT'S OWN 
REQUESTS TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL 16 
i 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE JURY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING THREATENING CONDUCT, AS THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE OF A THREAT, AND THE INSTRUCTION DID 
NOT APPLY TO MERE THOUGHT 20 
VI. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT INCONSISTENT, AND DOES 
NOT IMPLY A LACK OF EVIDENCE TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 21 
VII. DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL AT SENTENCING BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED 
HIMSELF, AND HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY ERROR IN 
SENTENCING 24 
CONCLUSION 27 
ADDENDUM - No Addendum Necessary 
n 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) 17 
STATE CASES 
Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081 (Utah App. 1998) 1,11 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) 2, 3 
Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah app. 1995) 3, 22 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) 14 
State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997) 12 
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539 (Utah App. 1998) 26 
State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah App. 1991) 15, 16 
State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987) 2, 3, 15, 25 
State v. Gallegos, 850 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993) 2, 15 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992) 13 
State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132 (Utah App. 1994) 3, 22, 23 
State v. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d 469 (Utah App. 1999) 21 
State v. Lowe, 756 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. App. 1988) 17 
State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1987) 19 
State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah 1987) 19 
iii 
State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919 (Utah App. 1999) 2 
State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984) 12 
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998) 3 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) 11, 25 
State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1997) 17 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (Utah App. 1994) 15 
State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983) 19 
State ex Rel. W.C.P v. State, 974 P.2d 302 (Utah App. 1999) 25, 26 
Statev. W?M>,790P.2d65(UtahApp. 1990) 2, 17 
State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665 (Utah 1997) 2, 14 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999) 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999) 1, 4, 23, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999) 5, 4, 23, 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1999) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999) 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30 13 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 , 26 
iv 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
2 Wayne LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 18.1, 
at 401 (1984) 17 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970730-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
DONALD R. JOHNSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction on one count of assault by a prisoner, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding a preliminary hearing when 
defendant refused to appear. Since the hearing was held in defendant's absence at his 
request, any error was invited, and this issue is consequently not subject to appellate 
review. Astillv. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998). 
2. Whether the trial court's finding that defendant was competent to stand trial 
is based upon sufficient evidence. A trial court's competency finding is a mixed 
question of fact and law. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1997). 
However, when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must marshal 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the court's ruling. Id. Since defendant has 
failed to do that, he has waived the sufficiency argument. State v. Gallegos, 850 P.2d 
1185, 1189 (Utah App. 1993). 
3. Whether defendant, who declined assistance of counsel at trial, may now 
claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 
mixed questions of fact and law. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994). 
However, a defendant who elects to represent himself may not make a claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 189 (Utah 1987). 
4. Whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Since defendant 
did not raise this issue below, there is no trial court ruling to review, and the issue is 
waived. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n. 2 (Utah App. 1990). 
5. Whether the trial court properly overruled defendant's objection to a jury 
instruction. "The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has 
objected is correctness." State v. Pearson, 985 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Other claims of 
error in the jury instructions which were not raised to the trial court cannot be 
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considered on appeal except to correct manifest injustice. State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 
1221, 1227 (Utah 1998). 
6. Whether the jury's verdict is inconsistent and therefore indicates a lack of 
evidence to support defendant's conviction. "When considering an inconsistency 
challenge to jury verdicts, we 'review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict' and will 'not overturn a jury's verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable 
minds could not rationally have arrived at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
based on the law and on the evidence presented.'" State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 
(Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Bergwerff, 111 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989)). 
In determining whether a jury's verdict is inconsistent, 'the courts will not presume 
inconsistency; rather, they will seek to reconcile the answers if possible.'" Rasmussen 
v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Bennion v. LeGrand 
Johnson Construction Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985)). 
7. Whether defendant, who declined assistance of counsel at sentencing, may 
now claim ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are mixed questions of fact and law. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 
516, 518 (Utah 1994). However, a defendant who elects to represent himself may not 
make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 
189 (Utah 1987). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999): 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999): 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other 
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On November 22, 1996, defendant was charged with one count of assault by a 
prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999) 
and two counts of assault on a correctional officer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999) (R.3). A jury trial was held on September 16, 
1997, and defendant was convicted of assault by a prisoner and acquitted on the assault 
on a corrections officer charges (R.101). Defendant was sentenced to serve 0-5 years 
in the Utah State Prison (R. 103). Defendant timely appealed (R. 105). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The jail assault. Defendant was incarcerated in the Kane County Jail awaiting 
trial on other charges. On October 19, 1996 defendant was on 24-hour "lockdown" 
status in a holding cell due to a prior incident, and was not allowed to see visitors 
(R. 155:23). Defendant's mother came to the jail that day to visit defendant, but was 
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told by a corrections officer, Cole Brown, that she probably could not see him that day 
because of defendant's lockdown status (R. 155:23). Officer Brown told defendant's 
mother that he would contact the jail administrator to see whether he could arrange a 
visit with defendant that day (R. 155:25). A television monitor outside the holding cell 
door showed the outer waiting room, and defendant was able to see Officer Brown 
talking to his mother (R. 155:25). 
As Officer Brown walked by defendant's cell, defendant asked him whether he 
would be able to see his mother, and Brown responded that he did not think so because 
defendant was on lockdown status (R. 155:25). Before Brown could tell defendant that 
he was going to ask the jail administrator if an exception could be made, defendant 
became hostile and began screaming and yelling at him (R. 155:25). While Brown was 
still in the hallway outside defendant's cell, defendant threw his shoes out of his cell 
(R. 155:27). Brown then went into the corrections office across the hall from 
defendant's cell to call for backup. As he picked up the telephone, defendant threw an 
apple through his cell door, which splattered onto the plexiglass window of the office 
(R. 155:28). 
Officer Brown requested assistance from dispatch, and several officers arrived 
within minutes, including Officers Dan Watson, Shane Sorenson, John Davis, and 
Mark Fisher (R. 155:29). The officers discussed the situation, and determined that the 
best course of action would be to place defendant in a straightjacket (R. 155:30). 
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The five officers went to defendant's cell and Officer Watson told defendant 
several times to go to the back of the cell and face the wall (R. 155:31). Defendant 
responded by saying "it will take all of you to put me down," and "let's get it on" 
(R. 155:31,53). When the cell door was opened, defendant balled his hands into fists, 
ducked his head into a football stance, and charged toward the officers (R. 155:31,54). 
Defendant hit a glancing blow on Officer Watson, and then hit Officer Sorenson as he 
pushed the officers into the wall and onto the floor (R. 155:32,55). Defendant was 
finally subdued when Officer Watson struck defendant in the chest with his knee 
(R. 155:55). 
A preliminary hearing was held on November 21, 1996 (R. 154). Defendant's 
attorney informed the court that defendant did not wish to appear at the hearing, which 
proceeded in his absence (R. 154:3). Following the hearing, defendant was charged 
with two counts of assault on a corrections officer and one count of assault by a 
prisoner (R.3). This case was initially set for trial on January 30, 1997, the same date 
as another case against defendant (R. 156:4-5).l 
Trial delayed due to defendant's motion for a competency examination. At a 
pretrial hearing on January 24, 1997, defendant's counsel informed the court that he 
would be filing a petition to determine defendant's competency to stand trial. Although 
1
 Defendant's other case involved charges filed in 1993; defendant had originally 
pled guilty, but had been allowed to withdraw his plea in June 1995 (R. 158:4). 
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the trial court had misgivings about the sufficiency of defense counsel's allegations of 
incompetence (R. 157:10-11,22-25), it agreed to continue the trial indefinitely pending a 
determination of competency (R. 17-23). 
Defendant was then evaluated by two experts, who submitted reports concluding 
that defendant was competent to stand trial (R. 130-144). A hearing was held on March 
21, 1997, at which the court noted that defendant had been determined to be competent 
(R. 158:3). A new trial date was set for April 15, 1997 (R. 158:10). At that time, 
defendani iuii filed a bar complaint against his attorney, who had then filed a request to 
withdraw as counsel (R. 158:2-3). 
Trial is delayed due to defendant's request. On April 15, 1997, defendant 
appeared for trial, but was unprepared to proceed (R. 159:3). The court warned 
defendant that a continuance at that point would result in a delay of more than a couple 
of weeks, due to the court's full calendar, and defendant agreed (R. 159:16). The 
prosecutor inquired whether the court wished to appoint standby counsel to aid 
defendant in his case, and defendant stated that he would like the assistance of standby 
counsel (R. 159:19) The court appointed Karlin Myers to represent defendant 
(R. 159:34). The trial date was then set for May 8, 1997 (R. 159:36). 
Defendant requests another continuance and discharges his second attorney. 
On April 28, 1997, defendant appeared before the court with his attorney to request a 
continuance of the trial in order to allow further preparation (R. 160:6). The court 
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warned defendant that a continuance at that time could result in a delay of several 
months, and defendant agreed (R. 160:8). A new trial date for both of the cases 
pending against defendant was set for June 19, 1997 (R. 160:13). 
On May 16, 1997, a pretrial hearing was held at which defendant's new counsel, 
Mr. Myers, informed the court that he could no longer represent defendant due to 
defendant's "angry and agitated and foul and threatening" behavior (R. 161:7). Myers 
filed a motion to withdraw as defendant's counsel (R. 161:10), and the court was unable 
to appoint another attorney, as defendant would not accept any representation 
(R. 161:15-16,19). Defendant agreed that the trial should go forward on June 19 as 
scheduled (R. 161:17). The court granted Myers' motion to withdraw as defendant's 
counsel, but appointed Myers as standby counsel to assist defendant as needed 
(R.161:18). 
The other case pending against defendant went to trial on June 19, 1997 as 
scheduled, and this case was postponed (R. 162:2). A jury trial on these charges was 
held on September 16, 1977 (R.163). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant's claim that the trial court erred in holding the preliminary 
hearing in his absence is not subject to appellate review because no objection was 
made, and because defendant requested that the hearing proceed in his absence, thus 
inviting any error in holding the hearing. 
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In addition, there is no error in allowing a defendant to waive his appearance at 
a preliminary hearing through his attorney, as the entire hearing may be waived 
through that means. 
Point II. Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the court's 
finding that he was competent to stand trial, citing only the limited facts used to support 
defendant's petition for a determination of competency, and failing to consider the 
uncontroverted evidence in the psychologists' reports relied upon by the trial court. 
Point III. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because 
defendant represented himself at trial, and therefore cannot raise this claim. In 
addition, the court's appointment of standby counsel was proper, as such a procedure is 
recommended in all cases. 
Point IV. Defendant's claim that his right to a speedy trial was violated is not 
subject to appellate review, since that claim was not raised in the trial court. 
Nevertheless, defendant's right to a speedy trial was not violated: virtually all of the 
delay in this case is attributable to defendant's own actions, including his petition for a 
competency evaluation and several requests for a continuance of the trial. These delays 
were all opposed by the prosecutor. In addition, the trial was held only one month 
after defendant requested disposition of the matter, and defendant has not alleged that 
he was prejudiced by any delay. 
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Point V. The trial court properly overruled defendant's objection to the jury 
instruction regarding the use of the word "threaten" because the evidence would have 
supported a finding by the jury that a threat was made. Defendant's claim that the 
instructions are confusing cannot be reviewed, since no such objection was made at trial 
and no manifest injustice is alleged. 
Point VI. Although the jury convicted defendant on one charge and acquitted 
him on two charges, the verdicts are not inconsistent and do not imply a lack of 
evidence. The different charges required proof of different elements, and were directed 
at different incidents: the 'assault by a prisoner' charge was violated when defendant 
charged at and hit the officers in his cell, and the 'assault on a corrections officer' 
charges were alleged to have occurred when defendant threw objects out of his cell 
while an officer was standing nearby. There is no inconsistency in the jury's finding 
that the evidence did not support a finding that defendant intended to throw the objects 
at the corrections officer, but that defendant was guilty of assault when he charged at 
the officers in his cell. 
Point VII. Defendant's argument that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at sentencing fails because defendant represented himself at sentencing, and 
therefore cannot raise this claim. In addition, defendant alleges only one error at 
sentencing arising out his representation: failure to request sentencing on a lesser 
offense. However, this argument would not have affected defendant's sentence even if 
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it had been raised; defendant was not entitled to sentencing on a lesser offense under 
State v. ShondeU 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969), because the lesser offense did not 
proscribe exactly the same conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT REFUSED TO APPEAR FOR HIS PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
CONDUCTING THE HEARING IN HIS ABSENCE 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in conducting a preliminary hearing in 
his absence, arguing that a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in the proceedings, 
and that there is no trial strategy which would have been served by his absence. Brief 
of Appellant, pp. 17-19. This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, the court did not order that defendant be absent from the hearing. Rather, 
defendant's attorney informed the court that defendant "specifically requested not to be 
in Court today. So he did not want to come." (R. 154:3). Since defendant's counsel 
failed to object to (and endorsed) the court's decision to go forward with the 
preliminary hearing in defendant's absence, the issue is not preserved and is not subject 
to appellate review. Astill v. Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("As the Utah appellate courts 
have reiterated many times, we generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the first time.")). Tn 
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addition, since defendant himself actually requested that the hearing be conducted 
without him, any error in the court's decision to proceed with the hearing would 
constitute invited error and would therefore not be reviewable on appeal. State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) ("If a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, we will 
then decline to save that party from the error"). 
In any event, the court's decision to proceed with the hearing was not error. 
Defendant does not cite any authority for the proposition that a defendant may not 
waive, through his counsel, his personal appearance at a preliminary hearing. In fact, 
the entire preliminary hearing may be waived by a defendant, either in person or 
through counsel, or even by implication. State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760, 764 (Utah 
1984) (citing State v. Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 P. 897 (1912) ("such a waiver may be 
deemed to have taken place, unless accused at the proper time and in a proper manner 
indicates that he does not waive any thing"). There is no requirement that the court 
question defendant concerning his desire to waive a preliminary hearing, and if 
defendant is allowed to waive the hearing entirely through his attorney, he obviously 
may waive his right to appear personally at the hearing by that method. 
Finally, defendant has failed to assert that his absence from the preliminary 
hearing resulted in any prejudice to him. "Tor an error to require reversal, the 
likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in 
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the verdict.'" State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) {quoting State v. 
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Instead, 
defendant argues that his absence from the hearing somehow prejudiced the State and 
the court. Brief of Appellant, pp. 18-19. However, the nature of the State's interest in 
forcing defendant to attend the hearing is not described by defendant in his brief, 
to the court's interest, defendant asserts only that the court is "entitled to observe the 
demeanor" of defendant. Defendant does not explain why the court has an interest in 
watching a defendant as he sits at counsel table during a preliminary hearing. 
•••'' POIN1 II 
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND DEFENDANT COMPETENT TO 
STAND TRIAL BASED UPON UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE 
Defendant questions the factual basis for the court's finding that he was 
competent to stand trial. Defendant asserts, without citation to the record, that "there 
was much to suggest" that he was incapable of assisting in his own defense. Brief of 
Appellant, p. 19. To the contrary, both psychologists who examined defendant found 
him to be fully competent to stand trial (R.137, 133). Indeed, both psychologists found 
that defendant has no substantial mental illness. See R.137 ("[defendant] presents with 
no symptoms of a major mood or psychotic disorder, does not appear to be suffering 
from intellectual or organic deficits, and does not currently meet the criteria for a major 
mental illness."); R.133 ("There is no substantial mental illness"). 
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The court considered this report, and found that defendant was, in fact, 
competent to stand trial (R. 158:3). No evidence contrary to the conclusions of the 
examining psychologists was presented, and defendant does not argue that the evidence 
presented to the court was insufficient to support the court's finding that he was 
competent to stand trial.2 Indeed, as the court noted, defendant had been found 
competent to stand trial on two occasions prior to this (R. 157:10). 
The determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand to trial is a 
mixed question of fact and law. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1997). 
As in Woodland, 
[defendant's] challenge centers on the trial court's factual findings 
regarding his competency, not on the legal interpretation of statutory 
competence. Thus, the court's findings on defendant's ability to consult 
with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding is subject 
to a clearly erroneous standard of review. In accordance with this 
standard, [defendant] must marshal the evidence in a light most favorable 
to the findings of the trial court and show that evidence to be insufficient. 
945 P.2d at 667-68 (citations omitted). 
In challenging the court's competency finding, defendant has failed to meet his 
burden to marshal all the evidence that supports the finding and then show how that 
2
 Defendant argues that the court's appointment of standby counsel constitutes an 
acknowledgment that he was not competent to stand trial. To the contrary, the 
appointment of standby counsel is a routine and proper means of assuring that a 
defendant has every possible help in representing himself, and is not relevant to any 
issue of competency to stand trial. See State v. Bakalov 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 
1993) (advising trial court to appoint standby counsel). 
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evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 829 (Utah App. 
1994). Defendant only discusses isolated facts concerning his relationship with his 
attorneys, some of which formed the basis for his first attorney's motion to have 
defendant evaluated for competency. Defendant wholly fails consider the reasoning and 
conclusions of the experts who evaluated defendant and whose opinions formed the 
basis for the court's finding. Defendant has therefore waived his challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Gallegos, 850 P.2d 1185, 1189 (Utah App. 1993) 
("Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim ot 
insufficiency considered on appeal."). 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT REPRESENTED HIMSELF AT TRIAL, AND 
THEREFORE MAY NOT CLAIM INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE < 1 i 
COUNSEL 
Defendant asserts that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. 
Brief of Appellant, pp. 23-25. "However, 'whatever else may or may not be open to 
him on appeal, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain 
that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of 
counsel/" State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 189 (Utah 1987) (quoting Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46 (1975)); State v. Drobel 815 P.2d 724, 735 n. 22 
(Utah App. 1991) ("The defendant who conducts his or her defense incompetently with 
li> 
respect to standards applied to attorneys cannot assert this incompetence as error on 
appeal.").3 
Defendant also asserts that the court's appointment of standby counsel is 
insufficient to provide adequate representation. Brief of Appellant, p. 24. However, 
the appointment of standby counsel is recommended whenever a defendant elects to 
represent himself. Drobel, 815 P.2d at 732 n. 14 (appointment of standby counsel 
should be considered in all cases). 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL; ALL DELAYS WERE DUE TO DEFENDANT'S 
COMPETENCY EVALUATION AND DEFENDANT'S OWN 
REQUESTS TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL 
Defendant argues that the delay in his trial from his arraignment on December 6, 
1996 until his trial on September 16, 1997 constituted a denial of his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial. Brief of Appellant, pp. 25-27. However, defendant did not move to 
dismiss the charge on constitutional grounds, and did not raise this issue to the trial 
court in any other way. 
3
 Defendant also fails to specifically point out any errors that he made in 
representing himself, arguing only that he failed to assert a defense of "diminished 
mental capacity." Brief of Appellant, p. 23. There are no facts in the record to 
suggest that such a defense would have been appropriate or successful. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999) (mental illness as a defense requires a finding that defendant 
"lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged"). 
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Although defendant's failure to demand his right to a speedy trial does not mean 
that defendant forfeited that right,4 it is well settled that defendant's failure to assert a 
violation of a right at trial results in waiver of the issue for purposes of appeal. "As 
the Utah appellate courts have reiterated many time, we generally will not consider an 
issue, even a constitutional one, which the appellee raises on appeal for the first time." 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990); accord State i 4; chambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); 2 Wayne LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, 
Criminal Procedure § 18.1(d), at 401 (1984) (if defendant fails to assert a claim that his 
right to speedy trial was violated, he may not raise the issue for first time on appeal); 
cf. State v. Lowe, 756 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. App. 1988) (unpreserved constitutional claim 
of speedy trial violation considered only under plain error doctrine). Defendant does 
not claim plain error. 
In addition, defendant has failed to show that his right to a speedy trial was 
violated. "'In reviewing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, we 
examine four factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether 
the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and 4) whether defendant was 
prejudiced as a result/n State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 129 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Leyva, 906 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah App. 1995). Defendant has not provided any 
4
 See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S (1972) 
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substantial analysis of these factors, and this claim should therefore not be considered 
by this Court. 
With regard to the first two factors, the delays in this case are all directly 
attributable to defendant's own actions. The first trial date was set for January 30, 
1997, but was continued indefinitely in response to defendant's motion for a 
competency evaluation (R. 157:10). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5 (1) (1999) (when a 
petition raising competency issue is filed, the court shall stay all proceedings). 
Following resolution of the competency issue on March 21, 1997, a new trial date of 
April 15, 1997 was set (R. 158:10). On the day of trial, defendant requested a 
continuance, and a new trial date of May 8, 1997 was set (R. 159:36). Defendant then 
requested another continuance, and a fourth trial date of June 19 was scheduled 
(R. 160:13). At all times, the prosecutor attempted to bring this case to trial as quickly 
as possible, and objected repeatedly to the delays imposed by defendant's motions for 
continuances and a competency evaluation. See R. 157:22-23 (objection to continuance 
for competency evaluation); R. 158:5 (request for immediate trial setting); R. 159:17 
(objection to continuance); R. 160:7-8 (objection to continuance). Accordingly, all 
delays between the original trial date in January and the trial date set in June are 
directly attributable to defendant's own requests. u[W]hen a prisoner acts to delay 
trial, he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a speedy trial." 
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State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah 1987); citing State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 
115, 116 (Utah 1983). 
Defendant did not assert his right to a speedy trial before the trial court until he 
filed a request for disposition of this case on August 14, 1997. Defendant's trial was 
held 33 days later.5 See State v. Miller, Itf P.2d 440, 443 (Utah App. 1987) (speedy 
trial claim rejected because, inter alia, defendant made "almost no effort" to assert his 
right to a speedy trial, failing to complain or file a motion to dismiss) 
As to the final factor to consider in ruling on a speedy trial claim, defendant 
does not argue that he has been harmed by any alleged delay in this case. The only 
prejudice he asserts actually cuts against his argument: he argues that he "was not 
afforded the opportunity to make full, complete or timely discovery in the case and he 
had no reasonable opportunity to investigate his case or contact potential witnesses in 
the case, he had no opportunity to examine the premises where the altercation occurred 
or to explore the policies and procedures utilized by the facility in the management of 
disorderly inmates at the Kane County Correctional Facility." Brief of Appellant, p. 
26-27. This prejudice, if it exists, does not arise out of delay in the trial, but would 
only arise out of unfair haste in holding it. 
5
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), defendant was entitled to have 
his pending charges resolved within 120 days of his request. 
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Accordingly, none of the factors listed above imply that defendant's right to a 
speedy trial has been violated. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN OVERRULING 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE JURY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING THREATENING CONDUCT, AS THERE WAS 
EVIDENCE OF A THREAT, AND THE INSTRUCTION DID NOT 
APPLY TO MERE THOUGHT 
Defendant cites to his trial objection to the jury instruction given by the court 
regarding the offense of assault by a prisoner, but fails to make any argument regarding 
the merits of that objection. Brief of Appellant, p. 28. 
The jury instruction proposed by the State regarding the offense of assault by a 
prisoner allows the jury to convict defendant if it found, among other things, that 
defendant "threatened, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another . . ." (R.84). Defendant objected to this instruction on the 
following grounds: 
The word "threaten"seems like that would be prosecuting someone for the 
thought. I don't know why that would need to be in there. A threat just 
seems like it doesn't amount to a physical show of force. 
Trial Transcript, p. 98 (R. 155:98). In overruling defendant's objection, the trial court 
noted that there was evidence to support a finding that defendant made a threat, and that 
the instruction applied to the words spoken (R. 155:98-99). 
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On appeal, defendant does not dispute the correctness of this ruling, apparently 
conceding that the instruction only reaches defendant's actions in making a threat, and 
does not allow the jury to convict defendant for simple intent. 
Instead, defendant asserts that the jury instructions explaining the elements of the 
offenses of assault on a corrections officer charges and the assault by a prisoner are 
"different and confusing in comparison." Since no such objection to these jury 
instructions were raised at trial, this argument cannot be considered on appeal. State v. 
Kiriluk, 975 P.2d 469, 475 (Utah App. 1999) ("'The failure to object or to request 
special instruction to the jury precludes appellate consideration.'") (quoting Etcheverry 
v. State, 821 P.2d 350, 351 (Nev. 1991). 
In any event, the instructions regarding the offenses are different because the 
offenses charged are fundamentally different, as discussed infra, at Point VI. 
POINT VI 
THE JURY'S VERDICT IS NOT INCONSISTENT, AND DOES 
NOT IMPLY A LACK OF EVIDENCE TO CONVICT DEFENDANT 
OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 
Defendant argues mat the jury's verdict is inconsistent because he was acquitted 
of assault on a corrections officer but convicted of assault by a prisoner. Indeed, 
defendant asserts that this alleged inconsistency of itself indicates a lack of evidence to 
convict, without any need for him to marshal the evidence, which he concedes is 
"uncontroverted." Brief of Appellee, p. 29. This argument fails because there is no 
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inconsistency in the verdicts, and because any such inconsistency does not, of itself, 
imply a lack of evidence. 
"When considering an inconsistency challenge to jury verdicts, we 'review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict' and will 'not overturn a jury's 
verdict of criminal conviction unless reasonable minds could not rationally have arrived 
at a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the law and on the evidence 
presented.'" State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah App. 1994) {quoting State v. 
Bergwerjf, 111 P.2d 510, 511 (Utah App. 1989)). Further, a "claim of inconsistency 
alone is not sufficient to overturn [a] conviction. In Utah, 'it is generally accepted that 
the inconsistency of verdicts is not, by itself, sufficient ground to set the verdicts 
aside.' There must be additional error beyond a showing of inconsistency because 
appellate courts 'have always resisted inquiring into the jury's thought processes and 
deliberations'" Hancock, 874 P.2d at 134 {quoting State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 
(Utah 1986). Defendant does not assert any additional relevant error beyond 
inconsistency which would imply that the jury's verdict should be set aside. 
In any event, the jury's verdict is not inconsistent. In determining whether a 
jury's verdict is inconsistent, 'the courts will not presume inconsistency; rather, they 
will seek to reconcile the answers if possible.'" Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 
391, 396 (Utah App. 1995) {quoting Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co., 
701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985)). Defendant's claim that the verdicts in this case are 
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inconsistent is apparently based on the bare fact that defendant was acquitted of two 
charges and convicted of one. However, "[w]hen multiple crimes are charged and 
when those crimes each require proof of different elements, there is no inconsistency 
between guilty verdicts on some and not guilty verdicts on others." Hancock, 874 P.2d 
at 134. The issue, then, is whether the crimes of assault by a prisoner and assault on a 
corrections officer "require proof of different elements." Id. at 135. They do. 
The jury convicted defendant of the crime of assault by a prisoner, which is very 
broadly defined: 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1999). In contrast, the crime defendant was acquitted 
of, assault on a corrections officer, is a much more specific statute, prohibiting only a 
particular type of conduct: 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material or any other 
substance or object at a peace or correctional officer is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.6 (1999). Accordingly, the jury's verdict is not 
inconsistent, because it acquitted defendant of a particular type of assault, i.e., 
throwing an object at an officer, but convicted him of a more broadly defined crime 
which includes behavior other than throwing objects. 
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Indeed, the consistency of the verdict is apparent from the facts of this case: the 
prosecutor argued that defendant should be found guilty of two counts of assault on a 
corrections officer due to defendant's throwing of his shoes and an apple out of his cell 
while an officer was standing nearby (R. 155:108). The jury obviously concluded that 
the evidence did not support a finding that defendant intended to hit the officer with the 
apple or the shoes. In contrast, the prosecutor argued that defendant was guilty of 
assault by a prisoner due to his actions in tackling and hitting the officers as he rushed 
at them in his cell (R. 155:109-11), and the jury found that the evidence supported a 
conviction on this count. There is no inconsistency in the jury's verdict, as the different 
counts applied to separate incidents. 
POINT VII 
DEFENDANT CANNOT CLAIM INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL AT SENTENCING BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED 
HIMSELF, AND HAS FAILED TO SHOW ANY ERROR IN 
SENTENCING 
Defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at 
sentencing. As discussed above, supra at Point III, defendant represented himself at 
trial, and therefore cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant likewise 
represented himself during sentencing, as he was sentenced immediately following his 
trial, at his own request (R. 155:123). Accordingly, he cannot now raise a claim for 
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ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 189 
(Utah 1987). 
In addition, defendant identifies only one alleged mistake during sentencing as 
the basis for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This supposed error is 
defendant's failure to request "consideration of sentencing on the lesser, but not 
necessarily included, offense [of assault on a corrections officer], even though the 
Defendant had been acquitted of that same offense at trial." Brief of Appellant, p.31. 
This is apparently an argument based upon State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 
1969), which ruled that a defendant must be sentenced to the lesser offense whenever 
two statutes apply to the same conduct. "The question under Shondel is 'whether the . 
. . statutes at issue proscribe exactly the same conduct, i.e., do they contain the same 
elements?" State ex Rel. W.C.P v. State, 974 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah App. 1999) 
(quoting State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, (Utah App. 1998)). 
Defendant fails to discuss whether Shondel applies to the offenses charged in this 
case, and it does not. As discussed above, supra at Point VI, the offenses do not share 
the same elements: the crime of assault by a prisoner generally prohibits any assault by 
a prisoner on anyone, and the crime of assault on a corrections officer prohibits a 
prisoner from throwing any object at a corrections officer. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-102.5 and § 76-5-102.6. 
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Because the two statutes apply to different behavior, defendant is not entitled to 
sentencing on the lesser crime. "[I]f the elements of the crimes are not the same, the 
accused may be charged with the crime carrying the greater penalty, 'even if the 
defendant could have been charged with the crime carrying the less severe sentence, so 
long as there is a rational basis for the legislative classification.'" W.C.P., 974 P.2d at 
305, quoting State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App. 1997). Shondel does not 
apply in this case because the elements of the crimes are not identical. Indeed, the 
jury's verdict indicates that the facts supporting defendant's conviction of 'assault by a 
prisoner' are not, in fact, sufficient to support a conviction of 'assault on a corrections 
officer.' Defendant was therefore not entitled to sentencing on the lesser charge.6 
6
 Defendant also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
request a presentence report, but does not cite to any authority or provide any analysis 
in support of this bare allegation. Brief of Appellant, p. 32. See State v. Bryant, 965 
P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) ("Utah courts routinely decline to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments"). In fact, defendant himself requested that the court 
sentence him immediately after the trial, explicitly waiving the statutory waiting period 
of two days established by rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 155:123). 
Defendant did not want to remain in the local jail any longer than necessary, and sought 
immediate transfer to prison (R. 155:129-30). However, in an abundance of caution, 
the court indicated that it would be willing to allow defendant to later withdraw his 
waiver of the minimum time period before sentencing and request a reconsideration of 
his sentence if he wished to have the Department of Corrections report to the court 
regarding his status (R. 155:129-31). Defendant never made the request. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ d a y of December, 1999. 
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JCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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